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Abstract: In this paper, we present a model of tax evasion in the presence of imperfect 
auditing. We show that there is a clear link between the degree of observability associated 
with a given taxpayer or activity and that taxpayer’s optimal declaration strategy with respect 
to fiscal agency. We also show that the degree of observability is critical in determining the 
optimal policies to be followed by the fiscal authorities. Our imperfect monitoring approach 
provides a new strategy for understanding the informal sector in LDCs, which can be 
interpreted as that group of economic activities characterized by low observability. 
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   1. Introduction   
  
    The seminal paper on tax evasion is due to Allingham and Sandmo (1972), who examine 
comparative statics of tax evasion with respect to change in the tax rate, the penalties for 
evasion and the frequency of audit. The idea that a taxpayer may be tempted to report taxable 
income below its true value was later extended by Kolm (1973), Srinivasan (1973) and 
Cowell (1985) among  others
1
.One  limitation of the approach of these authors  was that the  
tax rate, as well as the penalty for evasion and the frequency of audit, were taken to be  
exogenous. 
 
      More recently , the strategic interaction between fiscal authorities and the economic 
agents being taxed have been the focus of analysis , and  game theoretic arguments or 
Principal Agent models have bee invoked in order to characterize the optimal taxation 
mechanisms available to government authorities (see Townsend, 1979, Border and Sobel, 
1987,Greenberg, 1984, Reinganum and Wilde,1985 ).Even more recently,  the theory of 
hierarchic collusion developed by Tirole (1986, 1992) has been used in an effort to better 
capture complex  relationships between governments, fiscal agencies  and taxpayers. Chander 
and Wilde (1990) for example , show that  potential corruption of fiscal  agencies by 
taxpayers  leads to higher audit rate than when such a issue  is absent . Flatters and McLeod 
(1995) find that a  certain degree of tolerance for collusion can be an efficient scheme  given 
the resources  constraint faced by the government . Finally, Besley and McLaren (1993) 
consider wage incentives designed to thwart bureaucratic collusion, and show that the 
efficiency wage may not be an appropriate choice. 
       
     One  limitation remains in these studies of this strand of literature on tax evasion is that 
they all assume that auditing  is perfect, that is that once the audit is carried out, there is 
perfect certainty regarding the income of audited taxpayers , and this despite the fact that the 
structure of taxation is largely a function of the information obtained regarding non-
observable variables ( see,e.g. Cowell (1990, p.38). 
   
     The main aim of this paper is to provide an explanation of differences in taxation 
structures by stressing the role of the observability in the context of a simple model of tax 
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 For a comprehensive survey on tax evasion and implications for policy analysis ,see Slemrod and Yitzhaki 
(2001).  
evasion. Mainly, one corollary of our  approach is a new approach to modelling the informal 
sector, especially in LDCs: in our information theoretic construct the informal sector may be 
construed to be those activities for which the degree of observability is very low. 
 
    The paper  is organized as follows: in section 2 we present a simple model of tax evasion 
with imperfect auditing and the optimal fiscal policy; in section 3 we offer concluding 
comments. 
 
 
  2. The Model 
       Consider a population of taxpayers characterized by their revenue y .  Fiscal authorities 
can not costlessly observe his revenue, but they know the cumulative density of revenue  
 yG , and the associated probability density    ygyG ' , where  yyYy
O
, . Upon 
learning her type, the gent declares a revenue x  to the fiscal authorities. If yx  , then 
 xy  is the magnitude of this individual’s tax evasion. Imperfect auditing by the fiscal 
authorities is modelled in the following manner. Assume that agency spends 0c in order to 
audit a given individual once. Then the agency will observe  yyYy
O
,  with a 
probability :   qp   , where  1,0q  is the frequency of auditing and  1,0  
parametrizes the efficiency of the audit. In other words ,  1,0  parametrizes the degree of 
observability of the individual’s type in question once the audit is undertaken. This parameter 
can be though of as being a function of the sector or type of activity to which the individual 
undergoing  auditing belongs. In particular,  it can be interpreted as a measure of the formality 
of the sector in which the individual works, particularly in the case of LDCs, where informal 
sector activity , widely defined, is pervasive. 
 
         Suppose that individuals are risk neutral and that there is no advantage to overestimating 
one’s revenue. Then an individual’s expected after tax revenue is  given by : 
    
                 xyfxyqxyqxyqxyU   11,                (1) 
where x  is the amount of taxes paid when no audit obtains or when the audit fails, whrere : 
10   because taxation is proportional to declared revenue , and where  xyf  is the 
fine paid in the case of a successful audit. We assume that the penalty rate  f  i s such that : 
10  f . 
 
      Given the fiscal policy fq,, , the taxpayer chooses an optimal declaration. Given 
informational constraint, the fiscal authority chooses its policy fq,,  so as to maximize its 
expected net fiscal revenue. Its maximization program is therefore: 
 
fq
Max
,,
             cqydGxyfxqxqxqR
Y
   11  
 
st:   i)   10   
      ii)    10  q  
      iii)  Ff   
      iv)   dyUMaxArgx
yd
,

  
Where constraint (iii) involves the lower and upper bounds on the penalty rate : Ff  , 
and where 1F . Constraint (iv), on the other hand, represents the incentives compatibility 
constraint which takes into account optimal behavior on the part of the taxpayer; We are now 
ready to state our first result. 
 
   Proposition 1: 
   Given the policy fq,, , the optimal declaration by the taxpayer is given by : 
i)   
qf
x

   if   0  
ii)   
qf
yx

   if    
Proof: 
The optimization problem faced by the agent is given  by the choice of a tax declaration 
which solves: 
          dyfdyqdyqdyqdyUMax
d
  11,  
whence the first order condition is: 
 
 






qfyxqfx
fq
d
dyU
,0
,
 
                                                                                                                 (Q.E.D) 
 
 
Proposition 1 reveals that there exists a threshold level of observabiility parametrized by 
 1,0 above   which taxpayers are induced to reveal their true revenue. Consequently, 
there will exist individuals or sectors of  the economy,  for which observability is low , that 
will not declare any revenue. One possible interpretation of sectors which corresponds to 
proposition 1 ,is that they  constitute the informal sector, which is typically large in LDCs
21
. 
The following proposition , gives the optimal fiscal policy of the government. 
 
 
Proposition 2: 
 1,0 o  such that the optimal fiscal policy is given by : 
FandFfq
FqandFfq
q
o
o
o




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
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Proof: 
Proposition 1 derives the optimal behavior of the taxpayer , leads us to reformulate the 
optimization problem faced by the fiscal agency i the following manner: 
 
                    cqyfEqRMax
fq
 

 
,,
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fq
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where     
Y
yydGyE  
               cqyERMax  

  
fq,,
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 First, note that Ff   is optimal since it induces a truthful report .  In  PA : 
  fqyE
R




 
0  , whence    
      cqyEFqqRMax    
q
. Moreover,  if : 
 FyE
co   ,  then 1* q , which implies that : oF      , on other hand , 
0* q . Finally, for 
 
 1,0*  q
FyE
co  and    * Fq       .                                                                                                                           
(Q.E.D). 
 
       
        Proposition 2 states that the optimal policy depends not only on average revenue and on 
the cost of auditing, but also on the type of economic activity under consideration, 
parametrized by its degree of observability  1,0 . The first part of the proposition implies 
that it will never  be in the interest of the fiscal authorities to audit individuals in  the informal 
sector, where   is relatively low. Moreover, the last two parts of the proposition show that, 
in case of audit, the level of taxation depends upon the degree of observability associated with 
the sector in question. This provides a potential explanation for the heterogeneous taxation 
rates observed across countries ( Dudley and Montmarquette, 1987), or across sectors within a 
given country ( Virmani,1988). Thus, the imperfect monitoring issue and observability may 
lie at the base of the differential choice between direct and indirect taxes ( Cowell,1990). 
 
   
 
 
  3. Conclusion 
      In this paper, we have presented a simple model of tax evasion in the presence of 
imperfect auditing. Our results have shown that there is clear link between the degree of 
observability associated with a given taxpayer or activity and that taxpayer’s optimal 
declaration strategy with respect to fiscal authorities. We have also shown that the degree of 
observability is critical in determining the optimal policies to be followed by the fiscal 
agency. 
 
      Our information theoretic approach based on imperfect auditing potentially provides a 
new approach to modelling the informal sector in LDCs. In the model of the informal sector 
developed by Rauch (1991), an argument based on Lucas’s (1978) model of the equilibrium 
size-distribution of firms is used in order to establish a cutoff value in the distribution of 
entrepreneurial talent below which individual choose to operate in the informal sector, often 
defined to be that sector of the economy where firms engage in tax evasion. While it may be 
the case that in some LDCs informal sector entrepreneurs are of lower productivity than those 
operating in the formal sector, this does not appear to us to be  an empirical regularity which 
is true at all times and in all places. Indeed, in many LDCs , it is widely believed that it is 
informal sector entrepreneurs who are more productive. Moreover, it i soften the case that in 
the formal sector  in LDCs is dominated by state owned entreprises (SOEs) where managers 
are chosen not because of their high productivity but rather as the outcome of rent seeking 
activities. Our approach, based as it is upon the observability to fiscal agency of the sector in 
question, this provides an additional explanation of informal sector activity in LDCs. 
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